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ABSTRACT
SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MITIGATION
by
Roshan R Pai

In recent years, especially post 9/11, there has been an increasing awareness for securing
business supply chains against probable disruptions. With globalization and lean
inventories, the efficiency of supply chain has greatly enhanced over the years, but at the
expense of new vulnerabilities. Supply chain vulnerabilities have resulted in disruptions
to the economic stability and security. As a result, risk analysis and mitigation has now
grown to become one of the key links to business stabilization. To ensure business
continuity, it is necessary to identify key assets (physical and operational) within the
supply chain and secure them against probable threats.
This study proposes a methodology to examine risks within supply chain and
analyze their consequences to recommend the most effective and cost efficient safeguards
to mitigate consequences. Supply chain risk management and mitigation has been broadly
classified into two stages — vulnerability and risk assessment and risk mitigation through
implementation of safeguards.
The vulnerability and risk assessment stage aims at the identification of the most
probable threats to an organization by analyzing the related vulnerabilities to threats.
Bayesian probabilistic approach has been proposed to derive inference and model the
causal simulations. The risk mitigation stage aims at continuous monitoring and
analyzing risk associated with the system, evaluate alternate safeguards associated with

each threat/asset pair and suggest the most effective safeguard, which would mitigate the
threat consequences and occurrences.
The main objective of risk mitigation is to reduce the overall probable loss from
an adversary threat. The cost of implementing countermeasures should therefore be less
than the loss from a risk. Fuzzy game payoffs have been used to derive utility of
safeguards and evaluate alternative safeguards available. The safeguard selected should
not only be cost efficient but also provide the desired level of security to one or more
supply chain elements. The level of security provided by the safeguard forms the
feedback to the risk assessment stage and updates the risk levels until they are below a
pre-specified acceptable range.
The risk management and mitigation system would thus enable supply chain
managers to ensure sustainability of business through detection of high-risk elements,
reliable identification of cost effective safeguards and continuous monitoring of these
high-risk elements within the supply chain.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview
A supply chain is a complex network of facilities and distribution operations that perform
the functions of procurement of materials from vendors, transformation of these materials
into intermediate and finished products, and the distribution of these finished products to
customers. Supply chains exist in both service and manufacturing industries, although the
complexity of the chain may vary greatly from industry to industry.
Though the concept of supply chain can be dated back to the origin of trade and
commerce, it was not until the 19 th century that the industry realized the due significance
of the concept. In the latter half of the 19 th century, practitioners began to comprehend the
inter-relationships between warehousing and logistics functions that were involved in
physical distribution. The integration of these functions resulted in significant inventoryreduction benefits. With faster warehouse handling and optimized logistics, response
times shortened and accuracy of forecasts increased. Improved data communication and
analysis techniques led to increased ability to make complex decisions.
The next stage saw the addition of the manufacturing procurement, order
management functions, and the integration of chain functions. These additions, aided by
electronic data interchange, worldwide communications, growing availability of
computers, electronic data, and computerized decision support systems, revolutionized
the business supply chains. This new generation of the supply chain is driven by
advanced communication, adoption of more user-friendly decision support systems, and
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availability of shared information to all participants in the supply chain. Advances in
information technology sustains continual development of supply chain management
through the availability of more accurate global information, as well as the continual
discovery of tools to aid the analytical process making it possible to deal with the
growing complexity of supply chains.

1.2 Problem Review
The concept of supply chain has now grown beyond being a simple succession of
supplier, manufacturer and customer to being a complex network of interdependent
business chains. In today's connected world it is difficult for supply chain managers to
identify the location of risk, the damage it can inflict and ways to mitigate the risk effects.
Power outages, natural disasters, terrorism and bad management can all severely disrupt
supply networks.
Over the last decade, globalization and increased competition has led to low profit
margins, resulting in heavy cost mitigation measures. Organizations outsourced globally
to focus on core competencies, and seek out technical innovation and low cost resources,
resulting in large, complex and unstructured supply networks. The businesses focused
more on efficiency rather than on sensitivity leading to adoption of Just-In-Time (JIT)
philosophy. Due to the highly volatile nature of the market demand, the implementation
of HT policies enhanced efficiency and enabled significant cost reductions. The low
inventory levels lowered the risk of product design obsolescence. This, however,
increased system vulnerabilities and any small disruption along the supply chain could
interrupt the functionality of the entire supply chain. Unintentionally, organizations have
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created, or become part of, supply networks that are increasingly vulnerable to a large
number of risks.
Until a few years ago, the costs involved in risk mitigation measures were not
justified, even though the supply chain was vulnerable to disruptions. Moreover, since
the probabilities associated with the chances of disruption of supply chain were more or
less negligible, the awareness was not strong enough to motivate the study and
implementation of safeguards to mitigate the risk.
The heavy disruptions in the continuity of the supply chain posed by September
11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 11-day strike-induced shutdown of 29 West
Coast ports in the US completely changed the outlook of the business industry towards
contingency issues and aroused a sense of urgency towards the issue of risk mitigation.
Managing supply chain vulnerabilities and mitigating the inherent risk has been realized
to be the key to ensuring business continuity. The economic instability due to the rare
events resulted in disruptive supply chain instabilities and the lack of awareness led to
increased recovery times. The concern for these instabilities now outweighed the
relatively low probabilities of their occurrence and mitigating the effect of these has now
become the primary objective for survival in the market.

1.3 Envisioned System
A new decision tool, Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Management System (SCRAMS)
is envisioned, which would be capable of evaluating risk impacts in business supply
chains and mitigating consequences of risk elements by implementing effective
safeguards. The system would perform detailed examination including risk assessment,
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risk evaluation, and risk management to understand the nature of undesirable, negative
consequence events leading to loss of to human life, health, property, or the environment.
The SCRAMS architecture is shown in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 Overview of SCRAMS Architecture.

The primary objective of the Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Management
system is to evaluate business risks and their mitigation alternatives in the supply chain
environment. The tool will be channeled by the MIL-STD-882D guidelines and driven by
a rule-based structure to better understand vulnerabilities and assess risks. The analysis
framework will be developed using a responsive and intelligent inference tool capable of
learning from prior assessments. The SCRAM system will be designed to interface and
extract information from the Enterprise Resource Planning software and other legacy
database modules.
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The architecture of the system identifies three distinct, but interdependent phases
- data extraction, risk assessment and risk mitigation. This thesis will focus on addressing
the risk mitigation phase, by developing a methodology to identify and evaluate
safeguards required to secure supply chain elements against plausible threats. However,
risk mitigation cannot be performed without risk assessment, as there is a certain degree
of overlap between the two phases. Hence, this thesis will provide a brief overview of the
risk assessment process to enable clear comprehension of the risk management.

1.4 Research Needs
Risk management and mitigation is the process of identifying and analyzing the key
threat elements within the supply chain, evaluating their consequences on the supply
chain assets and implementing safeguards to mitigate the level of risk that the threats
pose. Risk management can be applied to a variety of fields ranging from insurance risk
to environmental risk. However, the basic risk management approach to most functional
fields is more or less the same, the only difference being the threats that pose the risk.
Conventional risk management methodology is generally applicable to static
elements, for example, a factory or a nuclear storage facility, which have fixed
boundaries for risk influence and is mostly a one-time assessment. Moreover, the
traditional risk assessment approach does not account for external interdependencies and
dynamics of the real time variations in operational and physical elements. The very
structure of the supply chain is based on independencies and the existence of non-static
logistic elements pose a distinctive dimension to the risk management and mitigation
approach. This also creates a challenge to the risk assessment managers. The continuous
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logistics and information flow along the supply chain limits the application of otherwise
one-time risk identification and assessment methods.
The most significant aspect of risk management is risk mitigation, or in other
words, reducing the occurrences or consequences of the identified treats. The
identification of supply chain risks unless backed up by a strong risk mitigation plan that
focuses on mitigating the risks, does not add value to the process of risk management.
Risk mitigation renders a wider ambit to the risk management process. While many firms
successfully implement strategic countermeasures for minimizing financial risk, they fail
to develop strategies for operational ones leading to a passive approach to operational
risk management. When a firm is indifferent to this risk, it focuses on minimizing cost
without regard to the risk this strategy creates. In this case, a firm might source 100% of
its raw material from a single vendor because it is the cheapest alternative, and therefore
fail to have contingencies if that vendor interrupts service. Many firms subjectively factor
risk by applying qualitative or intuitive constraints to a supply chain problem. In this case
a manufacturer might assume that making a product in only one plant exposes the firm to
service and capacity risks, but it cannot quantify the relationship between cost and risk
and therefore determine the best number of production facilities.
Hence, there is a dire need to supplement the risk assessment approach with a
robust risk mitigation system which should factor and implement cost effective
safeguards to mitigate the probable risks within the supply chain and secure business
chains from disruptions. A high level of sophistication and a rigorous methodology is
required to mitigate supply chain risk, which necessitates quantifying the relationship
between cost and utility (change to underlying factors like the network, suppliers,
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processes etc.) and generating scenarios that ultimately best balance cost minimization
with overall risk. By deploying analytical risk mitigation, firms can diversify their risk
with a nominal cost increase and deploy a strategy that will yield a low long-term cost.
And by building risk analysis and mitigation into supply chain decision-making, firms
can outline the risk potential and prepare the business chains to deal with disruptive
threats.
Risk mitigation encompasses loss prevention, loss control, and claims
management. The success of a business depends on the ability of the firm to protect its
assets from threats varying from natural disasters through Internet attacks to simple
human errors. The challenges is in balancing the value of the assets with the cost of
protecting it such that there is no wastage of money by overprotecting it, or worse, risk
everything by under protecting it. The concerns that arise in risk mitigation is that how
much risk is acceptable and how can that risk be mitigated and at what cost. By
identifying the threats and the risks they represent to the business chains, the business
value of the asset could be used as the selection criteria to identify appropriate recovery
solutions in each scenario. Risk mitigation demands expertise in managing networks,
system, applications, and security. Mitigating risk in supply chains requires attention to
and knowledge of risk mitigation research and processes in conventional and high
reliability organizations, as well as an understanding the nature and behavior of business
elements. Structured effectively, a risk mitigation program will prevent losses and reduce
the cost of losses that do occur while creating a low risk business environment for the
organizational elements within the supply chain.
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Though there have been studies on assessment and identification of risk elements
within a system there has been no clear cut methodology for the identification,
assessment and implementation of safeguards to mitigate the effects of these risks.
Identifying the most effective safeguard, which provides the best protection for less cost,
is a challenge by itself. With arising awareness for business sustainability, there is a clear
demand for a supply chain risk mitigation system that can help organizations of all sizes
to better manage the risks that exist within their supply chain network.

1.5 Objective
Though the concept of risk assessment is widely used in the financial sectors like
insurance and stock trade, the significance of risk mitigation adds a whole new dimension
which otherwise renders risk assessment futile. Risk mitigation and its applicability to
business continuity and contingency planning models have not yet been explored to its
full potential yet.
This study aims at bridging some of these research gaps and focuses on
addressing the issue of risk mitigation within supply chains by developing a systematic
approach toward identification and mitigation of supply chain risk. A performance
model, which is used to reflect the systemic structure of an underlying supply chain, is
introduced and a risk mitigation methodology is proposed to analyze and manage the risk.
The methodology focuses on assessment and identification of the best safeguard based on
its utility, cost, reliability and system vulnerabilities. The best safeguard is then fed back
into the supply chain model and the consequences reassessed to evaluate the risks. This
methodology would enable the development of a robust and intelligent risk mitigation
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tool, which would greatly enhance the capabilities of risk management systems and
enable managers to better assess and engage in more effective risk mitigation strategies.

1.6 Outline
Chapter 2 reviews the foregoing and ongoing research in the field of supply chain risk
analysis and mitigation and evaluates different tools used in the field for inferencing and
decision-making. Chapter 3 outlines the risk assessment methodology adopted in
SCRAMS process. Chapter 4 details the risk mitigation methodology being proposed in
the thesis. Chapter 5 illustrates the application of the risk mitigation methodology using a
case study. Chapter 6 summarizes conclusions of the study and outlines the scope for
future work.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND RESEARCH

Supply Chain Management is defined as the effective integration of information and
material flows within the demand and supply process [1]. This integration would include
the supplier, distributor, and customer logistics requirements into one cohesive process to
include demand planning, forecasting, materials requisition, order processing, inventory
management and the related logistic services. Though supply chain integration enhanced
the efficiency, visibility and responsiveness of businesses, the resulting complexities have
made supply chains more vulnerable to disruptions. Supply Chain Management is a fast
paced field and advances in technologies and decision systems keep the field constantly
evolving.
Risk Management has become relevant to all aspects of management, governance
and professions. Technology and process are seen as key drivers in a race against time to
establish new means of competitive edge and differentiation of services. The advent of
World Wide Web and advanced computer technologies has unlocked the ability to do
complex business risk analysis. Interactive systems can now harness the implausible
intuition of the human mind to model complex risk solutions. Risk management has
become a universal management process involving quality of thought, process and
responsive action.
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2.1 Terminology
Risk analysis is applicable to any field that relates to uncertainty. The following
terminology is the most common set of definitions used by researchers in the field of risk
analysis to describe the various elements and parameters involved in risk analysis.
•

Risk — Any negative outcome of an activity due to an unwanted or unplanned
activity.

•

Acceptable Risk- That part of identified risk, which can be borne by the
management without any significant business disruption.

•

Asset — Any resource that adds value to a business.

•

Activity — Analogous to an asset but is described as a physical transfer of material
or information within the risk environment.

•

Threat — an action or potential action with the propensity to cause damage.

•

Vulnerability —A condition of weakness; if there were no vulnerabilities, there
would be no concern for threat activity. [2]

•

Expected loss — the anticipated negative impact to assets due to threat
manifestation.

•

Safeguard — anticipatory steps taken to mitigate the risks.

•

Consequence — the resulting effect of an action or change

•

Target - Combination of a threat/asset or threat/activity pair

2.2 Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment
Risk Analysis is the identification and analysis of the most probable threats to a system,
the significance of the system varying with size and function within the boundaries of the
risk environment. In the 70's, the concept of risk analysis started to gain recognition
having derived its origins from the insurance industry. Its early focus was on protecting
against catastrophe and evolved to protecting unaffordable potential losses. Risk
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management evolved from natural intuition and analytical thinking into a more formal
process of communication of the controls in place to influence outcomes. Today, risk
assessment and management is the key to ensuring sustainability [3]. The increased level
of focus and formalization of risk management as a business process has created the
opportunity for experienced practitioners and innovative thinkers to capitalize on the
latest technology and break new barriers in developing business solutions.
With the growing popularity of risk analysis concepts, the terms threat and asset
have become conventional expressions to the risk assessment manager. A threat is an
unplanned or unwanted event, which can cause a negative outcome to an activity within
the risk environment [4]. The asset is anything, which can relate to a monetary value for
the system and could vary from being a single operational element within an organization
or a significant link to a full-fledged global supply chain. Risk analysis incorporates the
identification and analysis of threats relative to the physical and operational assets,
estimating consequences of threats and calculating the amount of risk associated with
each threat/asset pair.
Risks are a derivative of the system vulnerabilities and hence vulnerability
assessment is an integral part of analyzing the risk. The US Department of Energy
defines vulnerability assessment to consist of three stages - threat assessment (preassessment), target analysis (assessment), and prioritizing mitigation recommendations
and safeguards (post assessment) [5]. The threat assessment stage aims at determining the
potential threats, the effects and probable mode of damage. Target analysis determines
the susceptibility of the asset to the modes of threats based on the functionality, value,
importance to society etc.
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The vulnerability of a target based on the following factors: [6]
•

Level of visibility (awareness of target presence and visibility of the target)

•

Level of criticality (usefulness to population, economy etc)

•

Value of target (value associated with the asset)

•

Access to target (ease with which the target can be entered)

•

Level of hazard (based on presence and concentration of hazardous material)

•

Population density (max no of individuals at given time)

•

Potential for collateral damage
Supply chain vulnerability has been defined as an exposure to serious disturbance,

arising from risks within the supply chain as well as risks external to the supply chain [7].

Business Contingency or Disruption Management
Business contingency plan is a proactive executive commanded crisis management
program driven by business requirements and is defined as the preparedness of the
management to an impending disaster that can result in disruption of business. Depending
on the length or severity of the disruption, the survivability of the corporation depend on
ability of the management to reinstate critical business functions and to accomplish this
in a timely manner demands a well thought out plan in place ready to be executed.
A business contingency plan prepares a crisis management team authorized to
control any interruptions of the business to have the capability of responding
appropriately to any interruption, from the interruption of a single operation to a worst
case scenario involving complete collapse of supply chain functionality. Each business
function has to be critically analyzed to define the consequences of an outage of service
in quantifiable financial terms, operational impacts, and legal or regulatory restrictions.
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These consequences have to be assessed by management to define the acceptable
consequence level, which becomes the recovery time frame. Each business function may
have a separate recovery time frame. The management has to identify recovery
alternatives that cost effectively restores critical business functions within an acceptable
time frame.
The most crucial aspect to business contingency or disaster recovery planning is
the ability to communicate to large groups of people in a quick, efficient and reliable
manner in order to protect lives, reduce consequences, prevent or limit economic loss,
and avoid misinformation. Emergency notification serves as the strategic and tactical
bridge between response and recovery efforts. Disaster recovery and emergency planning
is basically a post disaster planning. While this is effective to survive in case of a disaster,
avoidance of consequences would be a more desirable approach to ensure business
continuity.

2.3 Literature Review
There is considerable extent of research in supply chain management, however, the field
of supply chain risk mitigation is still not been completely harnessed into risk
management and the literature available in this field is limited. This chapter summarizes
the foregoing and ongoing research in the field of risk analysis and management and
identifies the research gaps that need to be bridged in order to develop an effective and
robust methodology for risk analysis and mitigation.
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2.3.1 Risk Management Software
There are several software packages in the market, which completely or indirectly
address the issue of risk management. This section provides an overview of these
software packages. Sandia National Laboratories, a government owned risk management
firm, develops risk management techniques to assess security concerns in the energy
sector, military operations and homeland security. They developed methods for
probabilistic risk assessment using qualitative evaluations. The technique represents risk
levels in the form of matrices with row and column fields - consequences of threats and
frequency of threat occurrence. Each cell in the matrix gives the risk value corresponding
to the consequence and frequency levels. Sandia's technique has been used by the
National Department of Justice in developing a methodology for vulnerability assessment
of chemical facilities. The technique begins with identification and evaluation of the
facilities in an organization to identify high priority facilities. Activities in the high
priority facilities are then identified and evaluated to identify high priority activities. The
high priority activities are rigorously studied for possible threats, system vulnerabilities,
existing safeguards and consequences to estimate the risk factor using the risk matrix [8].
The vulnerability due to a terrorism threat has been of special significance to
military and customs and techniques like DSHARP and THREATCON were developed
to evaluate the vulnerability associated with the assets. These methods, though useful in
evaluating vulnerability, did not provide effective risk mitigation capabilities. The
Department of Defense (DoD), in collaboration with Digital Sandbox, developed a tool
called the Site Profiler for assessing the vulnerability of its establishments. However, the
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Site profiler mainly aimed at dealing with antiterrorism threats and other security issues
associated with an asset.
The Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office (CTTSO) uses the Site
Profiler for the Joint Vulnerability Assessment Tool Program (JVAT), used by all DoD
organizations and installations for anti-terrorism risk assessment and planning. Digital
Sandbox, in collaboration with Booz Allen Hamilton, a management consulting firm, is
using the Site Profiler to manage the bio-terrorism threats by tracking chemical
transactions. They are also attempting to extend the application of the Site Profiler to
track passenger and cargo to detect possible threats. [9,10]
The Site Profiler is available in two versions — The Site Profiler Enterprise Server
and Site Profiler Assessor. The Site Profiler Enterprise Server (ES) is a Web-based
system for emergency managers, security personnel, operations managers, and resource
managers to provide then with an enterprise level platform to access secure information.
The Enterprise Server was built for large organizations that need to get a big-picture view
of all of their security information and functions to facilitate timely and informed
decision-making. [1 1]
Site Profiler Assessor is a vulnerability assessment tool that enables professional
vulnerability assessment teams to ensure a consistent, collaborative approach to physical
asset vulnerability assessment. The Site Profiler Assessor was constructed based on
generic application development environment that combines a dynamically generated
object model, a Bayesian inference engine, a graphical editor for defining the object
model, and persistent storage for a knowledge base of Bayesian network fragment
objects. The Bayesian network generated allows users to manage threat/asset pairs. The
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constructed networks combine evidence from analytic models, simulations, historical
data and user judgments.
The working methodology of Site profiler can be summarized as below:
•

Data collection — data from disparate sources — users, historical data,
analytical models and simulation

•

Prompts the user to describe the features of an asset

•

Prompts the user to select possible modes of attacks

•

Identifies the elements that affect risk and evaluating their interaction

•

Constructs Bayesian objects and risk influence network

•

Computation engine solves the network and computes the risk associated
with each threat/asset pair using Bayesian network solution module

•

Computes the consequences of a threat using plug-ins like blast analysis

•

Checks for credibility of the model and if the evidence is not credible, then
the program goes back to data collection module and prompts the user to
enter data or to take a decision.

•

Generates the report

The software, however, is applicable only to physical assets, which is assessed for
vulnerabilities based on the blast model technique. Non-physical assets like information
and non-static logistic elements cannot be assessed using this technique. The Site Profiler
is more or less risk assessment or vulnerability assessment software and not risks
management software. Risk mitigation, which is an integral part of the risk management
approach, is not integrated into the risk assessment approach.
The Buddy System, a risk management package developed by Counter-Measures
Incorporation, is designed to evaluate vulnerability of assets to threat not only from
terrorism, but also those from accidental disruptive elements as well. Raytheon
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Corporation is using the Buddy System in support of work related to Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 63 for the National Communications System (NCS) and the
Joint Program Office-Special Technologies Safeguards (JPO-STC). The JPO work is part
of the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and Critical Asset Assurance Program
(CARP). [13]
The Buddy System identifies and deals with the risk associated in a system. The
package uses quantitative and qualitative analysis methodologies to compute the risk
associated in a system. The software, after determining the current level of vulnerability,
suggests safeguards to mitigate the risks associated in the system. The software works on
the assumption that implementing safeguards will reduce vulnerability. [2]
The systematic procedure adopted by the Buddy System to assess risk is given
below:
1. Comprehensive survey to generate or update relational database
a. Survey preload feature completes 75% of survey by populating the
database of previous surveys
b. User answers a series of questions and has a self configuring system to fit
the environment being surveyed
2. Survey is imported into analysis module by analyst
3. Establishes logical relationship between two or more surveys
4. Initial vulnerability levels are represented on the screen
5. Acceptable levels of vulnerability are set based on data sensitivity or other factors
established by survey
6. Determines level of vulnerability of the system and displays graphically in either
average or worst case scenario
7. Finds out threat activity
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8. Calculates risk and loss probability based on level of vulnerability
9. Offers counter-measures based on rules and regulations and Return on Investment
10. Generates formal Project level risk analysis report
11. Surveys are saved as closed loops and can be modified at any later point (need not
do the entire survey again and again)

The Buddy System [13] identifies two types of safeguards — Required and
Discretionary. The safeguards that can be traced to one or more written rules or
regulations have been categorized as Required Safeguards. The sensitivity of operation or
asset, determine which regulations apply, which in turn decides which safeguard to apply.
Rules and regulations are usually available for operational and process elements.
However, for a global supply chain, due to increasing complexity in network, there are
very few rules and regulated policies that are based on the benefits of all the partnering
organizations in the supply chains. Moreover, rules conforming to each and every activity
in the supply chain may not be easy to obtain.
The other type of safeguards, which the buddy system defines, is Discretionary
Safeguards, which are defined to be elective. When Required Safeguards do not reduce
the level of vulnerability to acceptable levels, Discretionary safeguards are implemented.
Discretionary safeguards are ranked by the Buddy System based on cost, using a Return
on Investment (ROI) calculation. The ROI calculation formula takes into account the
number of vulnerability areas any given safeguard will reduce. This would mean that a
safeguard providing a low level of protection, with low implementation cost and which
addresses many vulnerable areas will be preferred over a safeguard which secures not as
many vulnerable areas, but has high level of protection and high cost, even though the
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latter is more reliable. This, however, need not always provide the most effective solution
to secure assets within supply chains. The vulnerabilities should be secured based on their
significance. Since interdependencies are key drivers in supply chain, securing the asset
with the highest vulnerability, even though at high cost, can result in the reduction of
many related vulnerabilities within the system.
Return on investment is generally based on the amount of money that a company
would loose provided the vulnerabilities were not secured by the safeguard. There are
many other factors that need to be considered other than just the potential loss. The
reliability of the safeguard would be a critical element in the selection of the safeguard.
Also, the chances of disruption of the safeguard also cannot be ruled out.
The Cobre Group [14] has developed software, Helpmate, to simulate the supply
chain elements for optimal resource planning. It does not provide any risk assessment
capabilities, but creates a standardized platform to document and map the various process
elements within the organization.
The company, E Team, Inc. [15] provides enterprise-level collaborative software
to public agencies and corporations for use in emergency response management, facility
and event security, disaster preparedness and recovery, and business continuity. In an
event of disaster, the E Team solution deploys rapidly, enabling all users to communicate
and collaborate in real time, and manage resources as the situation demands. E-Team
provides a common enterprise level platform which helps coordinate and communicate
effectively to help recover from a disaster.
At the Los Alamos National Laboratory, researchers have developed simulation
tools to analyze certain key areas like transportation, epidemic breakouts and
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infrastructure independencies. These simulations result in better understanding of key
factors influencing an activity. For example, the simulation of the traffic system enables a
better understanding of traffic bottlenecks and the traffic control can then be modified to
avoid this. The simulations perform different iterations for different safeguards and show
the relative effect of their implementation. The system by itself does not seem to suggest
any safeguard but the simulations represented graphically can be interpreted better. [16]
Palisade's @RISK [17] is a financial risk analysis and Monte Carlo simulation
add-in for Microsoft Excel. @RISK integrates with the excel spreadsheet, adding risk
analysis to the existing models. @RISK uses Risk probability distribution functions to
define uncertainties and displays all possible outcomes in a situation and their
probabilities of occurrence. However, the software has no decision inference capabilities.

Vulnerability Assessment Process
B. D. Jenkins proposed a set of axioms to carry out the risk analysis procedure [2]:
1. The same population of threats exist for all systems and networks
The threats posed to a system are infinite in number and variety. Any threat can
occur in any part of the system at an unpredictable and uncontrollable frequency.
The only factor that can be estimated is the relative likelihood based on prior
occurrences, for example the likelihood of Colorado and California being hit by
an earthquake is higher than any other state in the US, but there is still a great deal
of uncertainty associated with the occurrences.
2. The frequency of occurrence of a threat cannot be controlled.
3. The level of the vulnerability decreases as the safeguards increase.
Implementation of safeguards reduce the risk in the system, the extent of
reduction in the risk depends on the safeguard implemented.
4. All safeguards have inherent vulnerabilities.
5. An acceptable level of vulnerability can be achieved through the implementation
of safeguards.
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Based on the above axioms and summarizing the procedures used by the other
software packages in the market, a generic process is outlined below in the following
steps:
1

Identify and evaluate the supply chain components and list its assets

2

Evaluate assets based on value, criticality, sensitivity or a mix of these

3

Identify threats within risk environment

4 Evaluate threats and determine consequences on the assets
5

Estimate risk associated with each threat/asset pair

6

Identify high risk elements

7

Identify safeguards to secure assets

8

Evaluate safeguards against each other for utility and cost

9

Identify best safeguard

10 Implement Safeguard
11 Generate Report

The risk analysis and mitigation report must document the threats posed to the
system and the safeguards, which secure them. The report should recommend the
safeguards to be taken in order to reduce vulnerability levels to an acceptable level. The
report should ideally include the vulnerability level, the threats mitigated, threat
interaction effects, residual risks, frequency, particulars of the operational environment,
system connectivity, data sensitivity levels, residual risk and expected annual loss.
The main objective of risk mitigation is to reduce the overall loss from an attack
by implementing safeguards. The cost of implementing safeguards should therefore be
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less than the loss from a risk. In risk mitigation, though the cost of implementing and
maintaining a security measure and the indicated loss from the threat are trade offs to
retain the cost benefits, the expected utility that the safeguard provides often overrules its
cost. In some cases the implementation of the safeguards maybe guided by the
significance of the entity under consideration rather than costs alone.

Constraints in implementing risk mitigation plan [18]
•

Costs

•

Interference with ongoing programs

•

Lack of expertise

•

Lack in efficiency

•

Lack in functionality or effectiveness

Currently, with disruptive uncertainties lingering around business supply chains,
the industry calls for a risk analysis and management system specifically designed for
supply chain risk mitigation. The software systems discussed above, although
comprehensive in approach, do not pertain appropriately to supply chains. The Site
Profiler deals only with vulnerability of static physical assets. The Buddy System,
although detailed in approach, does not consider reliability factors for safeguards and
focuses more on cost aspect than utility aspect of safeguards. Companies like the E-Team
and Strohl Systems deal with post disaster recovery and management. Researchers at the
Los Alamos National Laboratories developed simulation tools to analyze certain specific
areas but the system does not incorporate more than one activity at a time nor the inter
relationships between activities. There are many more software which relate to financial
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risk assessment like the Palisade groups, @Risk, but all of them are very specific in their
application.

2.3.2 Decision Tools
Risk analysis and management entails a certain degree of intelligence to be embedded
within the methodology in order develop a system which is robust in its functionality,
reliability and consistency. The heart of any decision-making system is a good inference
engine. The inference engine must be based on the requirements of the network structures
and on the form of data available. Some of the inference techniques used in decisionmaking are Bayesian Networks, Fuzzy Logic Structures, Hybrid Networks and Game
Theoretic Reasoning. Kathryn Laskey, a renowned researcher of decision support
systems, used Bayesian inference to develop the Site Profiler [9]. David Heckerman, a
researcher at Microsoft Inc., Washington, used the Bayesian approach to model the
Microsoft Office Assistant [22]. Heping Pan from Australia is working in the area of
Fuzzy Bayesian Networks [26]. There is no study, however, that has been conducted
comparing the different inference techniques to decide which inference technique is best
for a particular area.
Selecting the most appropriate inference engine would be crucial to the reliability
of the system. At this point, no inference technique can be rated to be better than the
other. But the choice of the inference techniques would depend on the system model and
the behavior of the system variables and the form of data available. Bayesian Networks
are based on probabilistic inference, while fuzzy logic uses a more linguistic terminology
to define membership values that can manipulate between varying degrees of variable
definitions. Hybrid Networks, use both the applications to combine the advantages of
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probabilistic inference and membership functionalities. However, research of the
applicability of hybrid networks is still in its beginning stages of research. Once the risk
management system model has been generated and the behavior of the variables clearly
understood, the appropriate inference engine could be selected.

2.3.2.1 Bayesian Networks. These are also called Belief Networks or
Probabilistic Inference Networks. The idea of Bayesian networks was initially developed
by Pearl (1988). Bayesian networks in the recent years have evolved as an excellent and
powerful tool to handle uncertainty. The concept has become popular in the recent times
due to tremendous increase in computational power and due to development of heuristics
search techniques to find events with the highest probability.
Bayesian networks are based on the Baye's theorem, which was proposed by
Thomas Baye in 1763. The theorem combines subjective beliefs and the evidence
available to draw logical inference. Initially, Bayesian theorem did not find much
application, as it is difficult to assign the full probability distribution manually. With the
advances in computational power, network generation and data feeding, a new dimension
was found to development and understanding of Bayesian networks. Much of
development in Bayesian Networks has been attributed to the science of Artificial
Intelligence. [19]
It was not until the late 80's that researchers discovered that Bayesian networks
could be used to handle uncertain information. Horvitz and his two colleagues, at
Microsoft, developed a Bayesian based network to could diagnose the condition of
patients without turning to surgery. This method was effective and efficient in combining
historical data and imprecise subjective beliefs of the experts in the field. [20]
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Scott Musman, developed a network which could identify enemy missiles and
aircrafts and recommend the best weapons to counteract the enemy. General electric
developed a technique, which can locate emerging engine problems based on the
information from sensors and from the expert opinion, which is encoded into the
database. [21]
The basic idea of using Bayesian networks is to address the following
•

Modular knowledge in the world - most events are conditionally independent of
most other events.

•

Adoption of a model that can use a local representation to allow interactions
between events that only affect each other.

•

Make distinction between unidirectional and bi-directional events in the model

•

Define the causal relationship between events in a network.

A Bayesian Network can be viewed as an annotated directed acyclic graph that
encodes probabilistic relationships amoung distictions of interest in an uncertain
reasoning problem. The representaion rigourousy descibes the relationships using
quantitative structure that facilititates good communication between the user and the
probabilistic system model [22]. Bayesian updating provides a means of propagating
probabilities. Bayesian networks are a rich and powerful way of building probabilistic
models. The nodes in a Bayesian network is devided into three types —
1. Chance nodes — representing random variables
2. Decision nodes — the decision can be made from a choice of options
3. Utility nodes — represent the utility function
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Dynamic Belief Networks are similar to the Bayesian Networks, but for their state
variables, which are time dependant. These networks grow over time and can end up
occupying a large section of the database memory. But this size is controlled by
maintaining only two time slices of the network in the memory.
Bayesian Nets can be used for the following purposes : [23]
1. Calculating the belief in query variables given the values of evidence variables
2. Predicting values in dependent variables given values for independent variables
3. Decision making based on probabilities in the network and on influence diagrams
4. Sensitivity analysis to test the impact of changes in probabilities on decisions
Bayesian Networks are used in a variety of applications including medical
diagnosis, forecasting, manufacturing control, fault tree diagnosis etc.
Avantages of Bayesian Networks

1. Forward and backward reasoning enabling assessment of overall influences [24]
2. For simple discrete Bayeisan Networks with discrete nodes, the inference is
solvable in linear time. [25]
3. Conditional interdependance allows efficient updating and the probabilities can be
changed in wake of new evidence [26] [23]
4. Matches the real world where probability of one event is conditional on the
probability of previous one [27]
5. Domains can give a correct idea of the interrelationships making it easier to
comprehend [27]
6. Data can be dynamicaly combined with the network at the run time thereby
enabling continious monitoring [28]
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7. Elaborate research has been conducted in this field to tap the full potential of
Bayesian networks [29]
8. Best and consistent method for reasoning under uncertainty [28][30][26]
9. Can be used on real large scale problems [28]
10. Can combine diverse data including subjective beliefs and empirical data [31]
[28]
11. Can reason with incomplete data [30][28][31]
12. Sensitivity analysis capabilities [28]
13. Visual reasoning that makes all assumptions and evidence explicit and auditable
to the regulator [28]
14. Integration of multiple forms of data [28]
15. Bayesian Models are very robust due to the easy updating capabilities [30]
16. Can handle different kinds of variables like continious and discrete [30]
17. Can be used for data mining and fault tree diagnisis [30]
18. Ability to decompose a probability distribution into a set of local distributions
[32]
Drawbacks of Bayesian Networks
1. The events represented by each node has to be mutually exhaustive [29]
2. The number of conditional probabilities varies exponentially over the number of
nodes [29] [24]
3. The Bayesian network inference is known to be NP-Hard (not solvable in
polynomial time) and the inference drawn from the network is an
approximation[33] [24]
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4. Knowledge acquisition is difficult and requires a large and uniform dataset [29]
5. Bayesian Networks do not account for the vagueness in the variable states [29]
[23]
6. Exclude the possibility of an event that is neither completely true nor completely
false [29]
7. Updating new information is difficult and time consuming [34]
8. Exceptions like "none of the above" cannot be represented [34]
9. Though discrete and continous nodes can be incorporated separately,
combinations of them cannot be used in one network [23]
2.3.2.2 Fuzzy Logic.

Fuzzy logic is a superset of conventional Boolean logic

with extensions to cater for imprecise information. Fuzzy logic permits vague
information, knowledge and concepts to be used in an exact mathematical manner. Words
and phrases such as 'fast', 'slow', 'very fast', 'quite slow', 'not very fast' are used to
describe continuous, overlapping states. This enables qualitative and imprecise reasoning
statements to be incorporated within rule-bases so producing simpler, more intuitive and
better-behaved models.
Fuzzy logic is based on the principle that every crisp value belongs to all relevant
fuzzy sets to various extents, called the degrees of membership. These range from 0
(definitely not a member) to 1 (definitely is a member) with values between generated by
a membership function. This contrasts with conventional Boolean logic, where
membership of a set is either false or true, i.e. 0 or 1. This graduation from zero to one
enables us to smooth out and overlap the boundaries between sets. Unlike Boolean logic
where sets are mutually exclusive, Fuzzy logic allows crisp values to belong to more than
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one Fuzzy set. This means that in a Fuzzy system all rules are used, with each having
some influence on the resulting output. This is more of a consensus approach to expert
systems.
Fuzzy network is established through the subsets that are generated defining the
mapping between elements and quantifying certain degrees of membership (between 0
and 1). Any system that runs on Fuzzy control incorporates the concept of Fuzzy
variables, (like speed, temperature) and the concept of Fuzzy qualifiers (hot, cold, slow,
fast). Applying a qualifier to a Fuzzy variable generates a Fuzzy set. For each Fuzzy set
there is a membership function relating crisp to Fuzzy values, and which is defined in
terms of its shape and location. Fuzzy logic also incorporates the function of Fuzzy
modifiers (very, extremely, not very), often referred to linguistic hedges. These affect the
membership function by intensifying or diluting its shape. Fuzzy rules define
relationships between different Fuzzy sets as if-then rules. These rules can be grouped
into matrices, commonly known as Fuzzy associative memory (FAM).
Pure Fuzzy logic has extremely limited applications and the only popularized application
is the Sony Palmtop. The main use of Fuzzy logic is as an underlying logic system for
Fuzzy expert systems. Fuzzy expert system is a collection of membership functions and
rules that are used to reason about data.

Applications of Fuzzy Logic based systems
1. Robots and other automated control mechanisms
2. Camera aiming for live telecast (Omron)
3. Prediction Systems for early recognition of earth quakes
4. Archiving system for documents
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5. Flight aid for helicopters
6. Simulation for legal proceedings
7. Improving safety of Nuclear reactors
8. Temperature control
9. Traffic Control
10. Environmental Analysis

Advantages of Fuzzy Systems
1. Accounts for the ambiguity or uncertainty in describing an event [29]
2. Represents better interpolation between states for variables [29]
3. Represents uncertainty of categorization [29]
4. Simplified and reduced development cycle [35]
5. User friendly and efficient performance [35]
6. Can reason with incomplete data

Drawbacks of Fuzzy Systems
1. There is no completeness in inference formalism i.e. there is no optimal method
for drawing an inference. The inference can be drawn from a combination of
different rules, but no specific combination of rules can be clearly identified as
giving an optimal solution for a given problem. [29]
2. Basic functions like min and max, which are the core components in Fuzzy logic
are not supported by evidence, but are assumptions [29]
3. Backward reasoning is not possible
4. Membership values do not change in the wake of new evidence. [36]
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2.3.2.3 Game Theory. Game theory is the study of situations involving contending
benefits, modeled in terms of the strategies, probabilities, actions, gains, and losses of
opposing players in a game. Game theory can be applied to economics, political
management and many other fields, in which, strategic decision making in involved. A
crucial aspect of the specification of a game involves the information that players have
when they choose strategies. The simplest games are those in which agents have perfect
information, meaning that at every point where each agent's strategy coveys to take an
action, and knows everything that has happened in the game up to that point. A boardgame of sequential moves in which in which both players watch all the action, such as
chess, is an instance of such a game. The more complex games are the imperfect
information games, which mimic real life situations more appropriately than perfect
information games.
An analysis of supply chain strategic decision-making can benefit from applying
game theory concepts. Game theory attempts to model the results of interactions between
people or groups whose motives are not identical, if not opposed and has become an
essential tool in the analysis of supply chain strategies with multiple agents. This section
surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines gametheoretic concepts that have potential for future application. The section does not explore
the implications of game theoretic analysis on supply chain management, but rather,
emphasizes the means of conducting the analysis to keep the exposition short. Many of
the useful theoretical tools are spread over dozens of papers and books, buried among
other tools that are not as useful in supply chain management. [37]
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A strategy can be thought of as the complete instruction that drives the actions to
be made in a game. A player can choose a strategy without absolutely no knowledge of
the other players strategy. The strategy choice by one player is not allowed to limit the
feasible strategies of another player. In the normal form players choose strategies
simultaneously and the counter-actions are adopted after strategies are chosen. As an
alternative to the one-shot selection of strategies in the normal form, a game can also be
designed in the extensive form. However, normal form games portray a better proximity
to real life situation, where, the strategies are not chosen one after the other, but almost
simultaneously.
The mathematical theory of games was invented by John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern [38]. Since the late 1970s game theory has gained significance and has
proven to be a useful tool for situations in which rational decision-making depends on the
expectations about the game environment. Despite the fact that game theory has been
rendered mathematically and logically systematic only recently, game-theoretic insights
can be found among philosophers and political commentators going back to ancient
times. The study of the logic that governs the interrelationships among strategic
interactions and outcomes has been fundamental in modern political philosophy, since
centuries before anyone had an explicit name for this sort of logic. Since managers have a
special concern for the logical justification of actions, game theoretic reasoning is gaining
in confidence due to the facts that actions are justified by reference to their expected
outcomes.
The gains of each player at different stages in a normal game is described by
means of an abstract concept called utility. The numbers featuring in an ordinal utility
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function do not measure any quantity of anything, in other words, the numbers are
relative and not absolute.

Utility
Game theory can be interpretted as providing an explanatory account of strategic
reasoning. This explanatory account which justifies the choice of a strategy is termed as
the utility. Based on the utility function, games can be of two types — zero sum games and
non zero sum games. Zero-sum games are games where the amount of resources or utility
is fixed, and whatever one player gains, the other loses. This corresponds to a situation of
pure competition. In realistic situations, zero sum games exist only in a situation of pure
competition, where the interests of both players are common and all strategies are aligned
toward those interests. This is however, not the case in real life situations. Players
engaged in a non-zero sum conflict have some complementary interests and some
interests that are completely opposed. Hence the gain of one player, would not be the
same as the loss of other player. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter only
nonzero outcome, imperfect information normal form games are discussed.

Payoff Function
A payoff funtion is defined as a measure of gain that a strategy provides based on its
utility. Payoffs are generally functions of the utility. A game is defined by the payoffs
assigned to the players and a strategy is defined by the utility it provides. The concept of
game theory assumes that players are economically rational and a player can assess
payoffs to outcomes, determine paths to outcomes and choose actions that yield the mostpreferred outcomes by maximising their payoffs.
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Payoff Matrix
A payoff matrix is a nxm matrix which lists the payoff functions of each players
strategies against the other players strategies. Each field in the payoff matrix can either
consist of one or two fields depending on whether the game is a zero-sum or a
non-zerosum game, respectively. In relevance to supply chain and real world environments,
only non-zerosum games are applicable, and hence, the mayoff matrix consists of two
fields, which relate to the payoff functions to each player. Once a payoff matrix is
generated for a game, the strageies can be evaluated based on the payoff factions
depending on the objective of the game.
Over the last few years, game theory has proved to be a powerful tool with which
to design decision environments, and to understand interactions in systems. Game theory,
building on the assumption that agents are rational and self-interested, has been employed
in the design of mechanisms and protocols for interaction, coordination, communication,
negotiation, coalition formation, fair voting techniques, market-based resource
management systems, and industrial-scale information economies. [39]
Rapid developments in technology, communication, industrial organization,
economic integration, political reforms and international trade have made it increasingly
imperative to recognize the causes and effects of strategic interdependencies and
interactions. A strategic approach to decision-making is crucial in areas such as military
and naval warfare, trade negotiations, capital accumulation and investment, market
integration, regional cooperation, development and implementation of new technology,
international resource extraction, network sharing, competitive marketing and in
particular supply chain management. Since its inception, game theory has contributed
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significantly to the foundations of decision-making. As socio-economic and political
problems increase in complexity, further advances in methodology, techniques, empirical
investigations and applications of game theory are called for. Probabilistic and logical
inference techniques are being embedded into game theoretic models to generate more
robust and adapt decision tools.
Qiumin Zhu and Junping Sun have studied the application of game theory and
Bayesian probability integrated approach to configure a decision support system
paradigm. Bayesian game theory has been used as a viable means for modeling
uncertainties in decision support. The Bayesian game constructs information complete
games from information incomplete games by introducing random events to occur before
the players choose their strategies. The random event describes the cost functions
completely and hence is assumed to completely describe the payoff function. However,
each player will be assumed to know only his cost functions and utilities but not the
opponents [40].
Yan-Qing Zhang and group developed the theory of fuzzy moves by
incorporating fuzzy inference and precise inference within the classical game theoretic
approach. Generally the game theoretic approach can locally make the player achieve a
goal, but this goal is an absolute goal. However, the fuzzy based approach can make a
player achieve relative goals, in the sense that, it would not only be advantageous to the
player, but also disadvantageous for the opponent. [41]
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2.4 Summary
The recent terrorist strikes, political instability in third world countries, the last year's
shutdown of West Coast shipping docks and the 2003 Blackout have awakened supply
chain managers as never before to supply chain risks, some of which had been introduced
or heightened by the very actions companies had taken to drive costs out of their supply
chains. Now that this inverse relationship between risk and efficiency has been realized,
supply chain managers apprehend that they cannot focus on cost cutback alone, but on
inherent vulnerabilities as well. Risks lurk along the entire length of supply chains, and
are as diverse as political instability, exchange rates, carriage capacity, shelf life, natural
disasters and customer demand.
To avoid potentially catastrophic events, inventory managers and logistics
managers, among others, must manage risks, and not ignore them by balancing operating
costs with supply chain risk. An analytical risk mitigation process enables firms to tie risk
management into strategic and tactical analyses, thus reducing overall costs, avoiding
service disruption, and better balancing capacity and demand. To manage supply chain
risks effectively, firms should not treat optimization as a single mathematical exercise
that chooses the right answer to reduce cost or risk, but employ a higher level of
sophistication in managing supply chain risk-analytical risk mitigation.
There is a clear need for a risk management and mitigation system which can
assess and evaluate risks, identify potential safeguards and evaluate safeguards against
each other with an aim to implement the most effective safeguard. The effectiveness of
the safeguard should not be driven by cost or utility alone, but by a combination of cost,
utility, reliability and potential disruptive elements influencing safeguards. The challenge
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is in realizing the limits of risk that an organization, operation or an asset can endure
without any significant impact on business entities during an event of disruption.
The heart of any decision-making system is a good inference engine. The review
of different inference and decision-making tools, despite providing a good understanding
for the applicability to logical inferencing, does not provide any basis of judging their
relative capabilities. The choice of the inference techniques would depend on the system
model and the behavior of the system variables. Since most supply chain related events
are interdependent and it is better to model the system behavior based on historical data
than managerial perception, a Bayesian inference engine would be apt for generating
logical inference for risk assessment and evaluation. Risk mitigation requires strategic
evaluation of safeguards based on its utilities. Game theory has proved itself to be a
powerful tool to weigh strategic outcomes and would be the right tool to evaluate
safeguards against each other.

CHAPTER 3
SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ANALYSIS

This thesis is a part of an extensive research in progress at the Multi-Lifecycle
Engineering Research Center (MERC) in the field of supply chain risk management. In
order to enumerate the supply chain risk mitigation methodology, it is essential to
illustrate the supply chain risk assessment approach. The first few sections provide a brief
overview of the risk assessment methodology, which forms the basis for the risk
mitigation methodology being proposed in the thesis.

3.1 Risk Analysis
In recent years, interest in risk assessment approaches that better describe and quantify
uncertainty has increased in the scientific and regulatory communities. Faced with the
necessity to characterize uncertainty explicitly in risk assessments, the challenge is to
effectively identify, adequately quantify, and methodologically analyze all significant
sources of uncertainty for estimates of risk. Frequently, alternatives to assumptions are
not adequately considered, nor are the impact of specific alternatives on the final
sensitivity estimates assessed. To characterize uncertainty satisfactorily, the overall
structure of the risk assessment must be well defined, the alternatives within the structure
that influence sensitivity estimates clearly specified and appropriately structured to
incorporate and facilitate mitigation strategies.
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Risk is defined as the quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss
incorporating both the probability that a threat and the consequences of that event. Risk
estimates are typically based on two parameters - the frequency of occurrence and
severity of consequences. The more frequent a threat activity, the more significant the
likelihood of the threat occurring, higher the risk exposure.
The severity of consequences defined by the loss or disutility due to the adverse
outcome, indicate the degree of probable risk. However, either of the above estimates
cannot be used to alone to quantify risk. An event with a high frequency of occurrence
would not necessarily contribute to high risk if the consequences of the event are
negligible. On the other hand, an event with low frequency of occurrence, but with high
consequences can definitely escalate risk. Hence, risk is best estimated as the product of
frequency of occurrence and severity of consequences.
Risk = Frequency of Occurrence * Severity of Consequences (3.1)
The real challenge is to estimate the frequency of occurrence of the events and the
degree of consequences that the threat imparts to the entities under consideration.
Frequency of occurrence is generally obtained from the historical data or from prior
estimates of the event. Severity of consequences are estimated based on simulations,
prototype testing or from subjective knowledge based on the influences of the threats on
the different factors contributing to risk within the system domain.
The frequency of occurrence and severity of consequences are derivatives of four
parameters - probability of occurrence, consequences of the threat on the system,
vulnerabilities associated and the effectiveness of the safeguards in place. The Figure 3.1
gives a pictorial representation the factors contributing to risk.

Figure 3.1 Factors contributing to risk.

3.2 Supply Chain Risk Assessment
Supply chain risk analysis is distinctively different from traditional risk analysis due the
presence complex interrelationships among business entities. This section summarizes the
supply chain risk assessment methodology developed as a part of the SCRAMS (Supply
Chain Risk Analysis and Management System) architecture at the Multilifecycle
Engineering Research Center (MERC). The methodology is a derivative of the process
proposed by the National Institute of Justice to assess vulnerability of chemical plants
and Military Standard 882 D [13, 51]. National Institute of Justice developed a prototype
model to assess the vulnerabilities in a chemical facility. Even though the methodology
developed was for a chemical facility, the underlying concepts could be extended to a
supply chain risk analysis. Risk analysis of a supply chain is classified as below:
•

Asset Identification

•

Asset screening

•

Activity Identification
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•

Activity Screening

•

Threat Identification

•

Threat Assessment

•

Risk Quantification

3.2.1 Asset Identification
An asset is defined to be an entity that has value to the organization, its business
operations and their continuity. Assets include employees, manufacturing and distribution
facilities, physical equipment, operational elements, stocks etc. Asset identification and
categorization enables greater estimation of supply chain vulnerabilities.
The assets within a supply chain are classified to be under facility nodes or
logistics links. Any physical static asset is defined as a facility node, whereas any transfer
of material or information is defined to be logistics link. The logistics links typically
interconnect or network the facilities across the supply chain.

3.2.2 Asset Screening
Each asset within the supply chain contributes toward the existence and continuity of the
supply chain at varying degrees of significance. Gauging the assets based on their
significance eliminates redundant assets, which may not require a risk assessment.
Evaluating the assets may be based on several factors — the workforce employed within
the asset, the physical and monetary value, and the significance of the asset to business
continuity etc. These parameters may be determined based on objective values or
subjective beliefs, based on the detailed availability of statistics. Based on the parameters,
the assets are ranked to be under — high priority, medium priority, low priority and very
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low priority asset. If the priority value is high or medium, then an assessment is
recommended, however assessment for the assets with low and very low priority is not
necessary.

3.2.3 Activity Identification
An activity is defined as any operation or process within an asset (facility node or
logistics link), which generates value to the business. Every activity can be broken down
into sub-activities; however, the desired level of reliability in risk assessment drives the
depth of activity breakdown. The higher the reliability desirable, the more in-depth the
activities must be defined. The priority of the activity is estimated based on the
significance of the activity to the asset or business, its recognizability and accessibility
and the amount of hazardous materials involved with the activity. The significance
estimates for activity is listed below:
•

Involvement of hazardous chemicals

•

Amount of hazardous material involved

•

Frequency of the activity

•

Recognizability

•

Accessibility

3.2.4 Threat Identification
Threat is defined as any potential cause of an unwanted event, intentional or
unintentional, which may result in damage to an organization and its assets. Threats are
generally associated with an asset or activity. A single threat may affect multiple assets or
a single asset may have multiple threats. Hence, it is necessary to categorize the threats
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and assets by forming threat asset pairs. This enables clear understanding of the
consequences of each threat on each asset. Threats against assets could be infinite, and
hence it is important to identify threats that relate to the risk associated with the entity
under consideration. Threats can be broadly divided into three categories - intentional
threats, accidental threats and natural hazards.
The underlying assumption which is made while determining the risk associated
with accidental threats and natural hazards is that the frequency of threat can be predicted
from prior rates of occurrence. Intentional threats, however, are completely random and
complex to estimate. Hence, it is essential to ensure real time monitoring of intentional
threats based on evidences. Information relating to adversary's intents, capabilities and
beliefs is rarely presented, without which estimating the probability of occurrence would
be a challenge. However, advances in efficient data mining, visibility of critical
parameters and intelligent support systems, enable real time monitoring of threat levels.

3.2.5 Threat Assessment
Threat assessment deals with the estimation of the probabilities of occurrence the
evaluation of consequences on the assets. This stage is critical to the sensitivity of the
analysis. The estimates of the risk are based on the subjective and objective beliefs of the
threat activities.

3.2.5.1 Frequency of Occurrence. The best technique to estimate the frequency
of occurrence of an activity or event is by fault tree analysis. Fault trees can be used to
determine the cause effect relationships between activities and estimate the source of
threat. This analysis is particularly useful to identify causal relationships related to threat
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activities enabling better identification of safeguards to mitigate risk. Fault trees are
discussed in further detail in the following section of this chapter.
Frequency of occurrence of a threat disrupting an asset/activity can be estimated
either qualitatively or qualitatively. Data pertaining to frequencies of occurrence is rarely
available and hence it becomes imperative to use qualitative reasoning as opposed to
quantitative evaluation. Moreover, it is easier to comprehend varying degrees of
significance in linguistic terms rather than statistically. Qualitative estimates can then be
discretely converted into quantitative values for performing risk calculations. As per the
MIL STD, the frequencies of occurrence are classified to be under:
•

Frequent: Likely to occur in the life of an asset or activity with a probability of
occurrence greater than 10 -1 .

•

Probable: Probability of occurrence less than 10 -1 but greater than 10 -2 .

•

Occasional: Probability of occurrence less than 10 -2 but greater than 10 -3 .

•

Remote: Probability of occurrence less than 10 -3 but greater than 10 -6 .

•

Improbable: Probability of occurrence less than 10 -6 in that life.
The probability of occurrence is estimated based on subjective knowledge or

intuitive beliefs to assign a probability value. An alternate approach to this is using fault
trees. The use of fault trees extends the application of subjective beliefs to causal
elements and enables reasoning and inference based on limited availability of data.
Fault tree analysis is a pertinent technique to estimate the frequency of occurrence
of threat. This technique has been rigorously researched and brings in strong systems and
reliability engineering concepts.
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3.2.5.2 Fault Tree Analysis. Fault tree analysis is a risk management technique
consisting of the identification and analysis of conditions and factors which cause or
contribute to the occurrence of a defined undesirable event, usually one which
significantly contributes to risk within the system. Typically, it is a top-down approach to
failure analysis starting with an undesirable event called a top event, such as a failure or
malfunction and then determining all the ways it can happen. The analysis proceeds by
determining how these top events can be caused by individual or combined lower level
failures or events. Depending on the inference tool being used to generate the fault trees,
backward inferencing is also feasible. This gives the system the flexibility to identify the
root cause of an event as well as determine the trigger of events that a root event would
generate.
A fault tree is constructed by relating the sequences of events, which individually
or in combination, could lead to the top event. In other words, the tree is constructed by
deducing in turn the preconditions for the top event and then successively for the next
levels of events, until the basic causes are identified. Fault trees use Boolean logic and
inference is drawn with "AND" and "OR" gates.
Fault tree elements comprise of two types of nodes - gate and event nodes. Gates
nodes have one or more successive nodes (child nodes) but event nodes are the
independent whose occurrence does not depend on the occurrence of any other event.
Events nodes are also known as leaf nodes and are the causal nodes. Gates nodes are of
two fundamental types: "AND" and "OR" gates. At an "OR" gate the probabilities of an
event get added to give the probability of the next event, whereas at an "AND" gate, the
probabilities get multiplied. This is a powerful technique for identifying the failures that
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have the greatest influence on bringing about the end event in a tree. The use of Boolean
gates coupled with tree relationships makes the fault identification process simple but
comprehensive in approach.
Incorporating bayesian inference to generate fault trees, extend a unique
capability to inferencing in fault trees. The boolean true/false states can be extended to
integrate intermediate states using this approach. Each event can now have more than two
states and new evidence can be combined with the existing data to recalculate new
probability value. Fault tree analysis is used to identify the causal events and to construct
a network diagram. Bayesian networks deduct inference on the frequency of occurrence
of the top event from the network structure. However, the use of traditional bayesian
probabilistic approach increases the complexity of populating the conditional probability
listing of each node. For a parent node with four children and five possible states for each
node, 45 conditional probability values need to be entered. Generating logical inference
rules, which replace the likelihood statistic with linguistic formulations, makes it easy to
depict the causal relationships.
Clemens P. L. proposed logical rules to perform a qualitative fault tree analysis
[52]. These rules have been adopted and modified to suit the problem in consideration.

Rules for calculating the frequency of occurrence

I. The frequency of occurrence of a "AND" gate is equal to the frequency of occurrence
of the most probable child if no two other children are at the same level. Example:
Probable, Occasional, Remote will be Probable.
2. The frequency of occurrence of an "OR" gate is equal to the frequency of occurrence
of the least probable child if no two other children are at the same level. Example:
Probable, Occasional, Remote will be Remote.

48
3. If an "AND" gate has three or more children having the highest level of probability of
occurrence among all children then the probability of occurrence of the parent will be
elevated to the next level. Example, Probable, Probable, Probable will be Frequent.
4. If an "OR" gate has three or more children having the highest level of probability of
occurrence among all children then the probability of occurrence of the parent will be
reduced by one level. Example, Probable, Probable, Probable is occasional.

3.2.5.3 Consequence Analysis. Consequence analysis is the assessment of any
outcomes that become apparent as a result of a threat activity influencing the supply
chain assets. The severity of consequences can be estimated through simulation, from
prior data or trough subjective beliefs, depending on resource availability. It is convenient
to represent the consequences by translating it in terms of pecuniary functions. However,
assessing the degree of consequence in certain cases like loss of employee lives or
quantifying environmental damages is difficult. Consequences in supply chains are
classified to be under three categories - monetary loss, personnel loss and environmental
damage. To connote the varying degrees for the consequence parameters, the Mil
Standard 88 D definitions have been adopted. The parameters have four degrees of
consequence - catastrophic, moderate, marginal and negligible consequences. The
definitions for these varying degrees are as below:
•

Catastrophic: Death or permanent total disability of personnel, monetary loss
exceeding 1 million US dollars or irreversible environmental damage violating
laws and regulations

•

Critical: Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness resulting in
loss of at least three personnel, monetary loss exceeding 200 thousand US dollars
or reversible environmental damage violation laws and regulations

•

Marginal: Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more work days,
monetary loss exceeding ten thousand, or mitigable environmental damage where
restoration activities can be undertaken
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• Negligible: Injury or illness not leading to loss of work days, loss exceeding 2000
US dollars, or minimal environmental damage without violating laws and
regulations.
The statistics in the definitions are listed as per the military specification and need
to be scaled to better configure the significance levels that exist in supply chains. The
consequence of a threat j on an asset/activity i is denoted by Qi,j

3.2.6 Risk Quantification
Risk quantification is the final step in the risk assessment procedure. Risk associated with
an asset i due to a threat j (Ri,j) is calculated as the product of the frequency of
occurrence,

Fi,j

of the threat j for the asset i and the consequences Ci,j of the threat j on

asset i.

The threat assessment stage estimates the frequency of occurrence and severity of
consequences in qualitative terms. These qualitative terms are then discretely quantified
to generate the risk associated with each threat/asset pairs. Table no 3.1 and 3.2 lists the
values assigned to frequency of occurrence and severity of consequences. These values
are not absolute and the significance level of the values indicates the relative level of risk.
For example, a "Frequent" event (with value 0.1) is 100 times more likely to occur than
"Probable" events (with value 0.001).
Table 3.1 Assigned Values for Frequency of Occurrence
Frequency of Occurrence
Frequent
Probable
Occasional
Remote
Improbable

Numerical Value
104
10-3
10-5
10-7
10- 9
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Table 3.2 Assigned Values for Severity of Consequences
Severity of Consequences
Catastrophic
Critical
Marginal
Negligible

Numerical Value
10-1
10-3
10-5
10-7

The final risk values associated with the threat/activity pairs are organized in the
form of a risk matrix to enable easy comprehension.

CHAPTER 4
SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MITIGATION

Risk mitigation is defined as the diminution of the probability or impact of a risk event
through the implementation of safeguard strategies. Without a comprehensive analytical
approach, risk mitigation decisions would be based purely on cost minimization or with
only a subjective assessment of risk. These subjective, simplistic approaches of cost or
risk minimization do not completely secure the business supply chain against impending
threats. To manage supply chain risks effectively, optimization should not be the single
mathematical exercise that chooses the right answer to reduce cost or risk. To balance
highest profit strategies against the flexibility and responsiveness required to deal with
real-world change or failure, a firm must balance mitigation costs with supply chain risk.
The risk mitigation methodology proposed in this thesis enables effective
identification of high risk supply chain assets, generation of safeguards based on the fault
tree analysis of the causal factors and evaluation of the safeguards against each other
based on cost and level of security they impart to the assets. A game theoretic approach is
proposed for evaluating the utility of safeguards and the cost of the implementing the
security measure.

4.1 High Risk Threat/Asset Identification
The most critical aspect of risk management is determining the acceptable level of risk
that the supply chain assets can endure without any significant impact on the business,
provided any disruption occurs. Depending on the type of industry, the criticality of
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supply chain assets and the fiscal constraints, the risk assessment manager can set the
acceptable level of risk. Again, the acceptable level of risk is entirely relative to the risk
values generated by the risk assessment system. The entire risk mitigation strategies will
be based on the threshold risk level. The acceptable limit can be assigned based on the
desirable levels of both frequency of occurrence of the event and severity of
consequences. Absolute risk mitigation may not be always desirable, as certain business
strategies may be based on risk prospects or gambles. Hence, it becomes a management
decision as opposed to the risk manager's decision in setting the acceptable or
permissible risk level.
Once an acceptable level of risk is established for each asset, the risk values
associated with each threat/activity pair is compared to the acceptable level and high risk
threat/activity pairs are identified. The high risk assets then have to be assessed for risk
mitigation strategies.

4.2 Safeguard Identification
A safeguard is a process, procedure, technique, or strategy intended to mitigate the
consequences of probable threats on the supply chain assets. Safeguard strategies are
based on the asset under consideration, its significance and the cost associated with
implementing the safeguard. It is imperative that the root cause of any disruption is
identified prior to selecting the safeguard. This is achieved using fault tree analysis.
The activity associated with the high risk threat/activity pair is first identified and
the root cause of it determined through fault tree analysis. The process starts with
identification of the causal events that could lead to the top event and the safeguards in
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place that prevent the occurrence of the unwanted event. The identified causal events are
further studied to identify possible sub causes. The process is repeated until there are no
further sub causes or the analyst is satisfied with the level of detail. Safeguards are now
identified for the causal events which can mitigate the high risk threat/activity pairs.
There can be multiple safeguards for one activity based on the causal events.
Safeguards secure the activities by either reducing the frequency of occurrence or
by reducing the severity of consequences. Since risk is calculated based on the frequency
of occurrence and severity of consequences, the safeguards can be identified based on the
utility that the safeguard is expected to provide. For example, an event with high
frequency of occurrence should be secured by a safeguard which reduces the frequency
of occurrence of the threat.

4.3 Safeguard Assessment
Once the safeguards are identified, they have to be assessed to determine the utility and
the cost of the safeguard. The assessment of safeguard is based on the following factors:
1. Level of Protection
2. Value of the Activity/Asset
3. Cost of the Safeguard
4. Reliability of Safeguard
5. Probability of Intent
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4.3.1 Level of Protection
It is defined as the degree of protection rendered by the safeguard against the threat for a
specific asset. Level of protection is denoted by Li j,k and is read as the level of protection
,

provided by safeguard k to asset or activity i against threat j. The level of protection
provided by the safeguard is incorporated within the fault tree analysis to simulate the
effect of implementing the safeguard. In the proposed method, the level of protection
provided by the safeguard is defined as below:
•

High: Provides complete protection and completely nullifies occurrence of an
"Occasional" event

•

Medium: Provides major protection, and nullifies the probability of occurrence of
a "Remote" event

•

Low: Provides few protection measures and nullifies occurrence of a
"Improbable" event

•

Very Low: Ineffective or no protection measures and events will occur with the
same frequency irrespective of the safeguard.
For computational purposes, relative values are assigned to the different levels of

protection, shown in Table 4.1
Table 4.1 Assigned Values for Level of Protection of Safeguard
High
Medium
Low
Very Low

0.75
0.5
0.25
0.1

4.3.2 Value of the Asset/Activity
The value of the asset is defined as the degree of significance that the asset/activity has to
the business. It is denoted by Vi. In order to enable managers to identify the significance
level of the assets/activity, eight critical parameters have been identified to estimate the
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significance of a facility node. These parameters have varying degrees of significance
and based on the expertise if the risk manager, the asset can be evaluated. The eight
parameters are listed below.
•

Inventory levels in the facility

•

Number of vendors or suppliers

•

Employees within the facility

•

Geographical significance

•

Significance to the business and supply chain

•

Significance to the nation

•

Recognizability

Priority value for a logistics link is also estimated based on eight parameters. They are as
follows:
•

Does the shipment cross national borders

•

Attractiveness of goods to adversary

•

Availability of alternate logistics routes

•

Hazardous or explosive materials

•

Shipment visibility or traceability

•

Population density associated with the route

•

Damage in the worst case scenario

•

Significance to supply chain operations
The value of the asset/activity is an important criterion in determining the utility

of the safeguard. In order to better comprehend the asset value, it is represented in four
degrees of significance — high, medium, low and very low. For computation purpose,
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each level is assigned a value (which is relative in significance and not absolute) shown
in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Assigned Values to Value of Asset
High
Medium
Low
Very Low

0.75
0.5
0.25
0.1

4.3.3 Cost of Safeguard
The most significant factor relating to the constraints in implementation of safeguards is
the cost of the safeguard. The cost of implementation of the safeguard is justified only if
the utility of the safeguard exceeds its cost. The monetary loss that would be incurred to
the firm in the absence of the safeguard should justify the implementation costs. The cost
of implementation of safeguard k to secure asset i against threat j is denoted by Ci,j,k and
is based on
•

Capital investment

•

Cost of maintenance

•

Salary to additional personnel employed

•

Miscellaneous costs

4.3.4 Reliability of the Safeguard
This is defined as the probability that the safeguard will not fail, or in other words, the
degree of dependability of the safeguard against the threat. Reliability of safeguard is
categorized to be under five levels — very high, high, medium, low and very low. This
factor is subjective and it is up to the manager to decide the level of reliability that a
safeguard provides within the system under consideration. Generally, any increase in
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reliability of safeguard increases the cost of the safeguard. For example, providing 10
security personnel to monitor a restricted area provides more reliability than 5 security
personnel, but at higher costs. The reliability of safeguard is represented by αi, j,k and is
read as the reliability of safeguard k to secure asset i against threat j.
4.3.5 Probability of Intent
This is defined as the evidence of increase in the threat activity leading to failure of the
safeguard. The Bayesian inferencing technique updates any increase in threat associated
with any asset/activity. However, it is necessary to check for any evidence in likelihood
of disruption of the safeguards. For example, if surveillance cameras are installed as a
safeguard against security breaching, then the evidence of a thunderstorm would increase
the probability of failure of the safeguard due to higher chances of surveillance
disruption, leading to a higher probability of intent. This is represented by MA and read as
the probability of intent of threat j against safeguard k.

4.4 Utility Calculation
Utility is defined as the measure of effectiveness of a safeguard in securing the
asset/activity against plausible threats. In supply chain risk mitigation, the utility of the
safeguard is dependent on the level of protection that the safeguard provides to the
asset/activity and the value of the asset. Utility is denoted by
computed as shown in Equation 4.1.

Ui,j,k. The

utility is
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In some cases, the implementation of a safeguard increases the value of the asset
due to increase in monetary value or increase in number of employees. This would reduce
the utility of the asset and the net utility if formulated in Equation 4.2.

The increase in the value of the asset is expressed in varying degrees — high,
medium, low, no and are quantified as shown in Table 4.3
Table 4.3 Assigned Values to Increase in Value of Asset
High
Medium
Low
No

0.25
0.1
0.01
0

4.5 Safeguard Analysis
The safeguards are now evaluated against each other to determine the most effective
safeguard based on the cost of implementation and the utility it provides. A game
theoretic approach is proposed to evaluate the safeguards against each other. The risk
environment can be viewed as the setting for a two-player game. The one player would
be the threat element trying to disrupt the high-risk asset/activity and the other player
would be the risk manager implementing safeguards to mitigate the risk effects. This
approach provides a comprehensive view of the risk environment. It enables identifying
the prospective disruption elements and effective identification of safeguards that can
mitigate these disruptions.
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Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among
rational players produce outcomes with respect to the payoffs of the players. A normal
game with imperfect information is defined in this methodology where both players are
not aware of the moves planned by each other. The most crucial step in the generation of
a game is the payoff function.

4.5.1 Payoff Calculation
A payoff matrix is defined as a table, which exhibits the payoffs ensuing from every
possible action by each player for every possible action by the other player [42].
Typically, the payoff function comprises of two fields, the first field represents the payoff
of the first player and the second the payoff of the other. The payoff function depends on
the utility or the gain by each player.
Player one is defined to be the risk manager trying to overpower the threats by
implementing safeguards and player two is defined to be the threat element driving
disruptive actions against the high risk assets/activities.

Player 2
Assets influenced by
threats

Player 1
Safeguards
associated
with each
threat asset
pair

(Payoffs for Player 1,
Payoffs for Player 2)

Figure 4.1 Payoff Matrix for the normal game.
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The payoff for the safeguards (player 1) is denoted by

Si,k. It

is read as the payoff

for safeguard k securing asset i. It is generated as a function of cost and utility as shown
in equation 4.4.

The above equation incorporates both utility and cost within the same function,
however, the higher the reliability of the safeguard, the lower would be the cost
influence. As can be seen from Equation 4.4, the payoff function, Sid would be higher for
(

a safeguard with higher utility but same cost as another safeguard with relatively lower
utility. Similarly, the payoff function will be higher for a safeguard with lower cost but
same utility as another safeguard with higher cost. This relationship would enable the
identification of both high reliability safeguards and low cost safeguards with ease. To
bring both the cost and utility to the same significance level, they have been factored to
fit the range from 0 to I.
The payoff for the threats influencing the assets (player 2) is denoted by

Ai,k. It

is

read as the payoff for asset i being secured by safeguard k. It is generated as a function of
the consequences of threat and probability of intent as shown in Equation 4.5

The above equation indicates the consequences that would result from failure of
the safeguards. However, if for threat/activity pairs with same consequence, safeguards
with higher probability of intent would generate higher payoffs indicating high
vulnerabilities. Similarly, for safeguards with same probability of intent, high
consequence threats would generate higher payoffs indicating higher vulnerabilities.
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4.5.2 Safeguard Selection
Once the payoff matrix is generated, the game is set for analysis. The first step would be
to check for dominance within the payoff matrix. Dominance can be defined as the state
that exists when one strategy overpowers another strategy for the same player. For
example, if all the payoffs for strategy 1 for the safeguards are more than all the payoffs
for strategy 2 for the safeguards, then strategy 1 is understood to dominate strategy 2. In
this case, strategy 2 can be eliminated from the payoff matrix because strategy 1 provides
better payoff for any safeguard asset combination. Table 4.4 illustrates a typical payoff
matrix.
Table 4.4 Payoff Matrix for a Normal Game

Asset 1

Asset 2

Asset 3

Total Payoff for
Safeguard

Safeguard 1

(S1,1 , A1,1) (S1,2 , A1,2)

(S1,3 , A1,3)

E Si

Safeguard 2

(S2,1 , A2,1) (S2,2 , A2,2)

(S2,3 , A2,3)

I

Safeguard 3

(S3,1 , A3,1) (S3,2 , A3,2)

(S3,3 , A3,3)

E S3

Total Payoff
for Assets

1 Al

E A2

S2

E A3

The next step would be to identify the most vulnerable asset based on the highest
total payoff for the assets. The first step toward safeguard selection would be to secure
the most vulnerable asset using the most effective safeguard. For this purpose, the
following methodology is adopted.
1. Identify the most vulnerable asset as the asset with highest value in the row "Total
Payoff for Assets"
2. Identify safeguards, which secure the most vulnerable asset, obtained from the
previous step.
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3. Determine the most effective safeguard among the safeguards which secure the
most vulnerable asset as safeguard with the highest value in the "Total Payoffs for
Safeguard" column.
4. Select the safeguard.

4.5.3 Safeguard Implementation

The safeguard selected is now assessed to determine the type of protection it provides.
The safeguard can either reduce the frequency of occurrence of a threat or reduce the
severity of consequences. A safeguard that reduces the frequency of occurrence is fed
back into the fault tree analysis. The selected safeguard now gets added to the fault tree
structure and the probabilities of occurrence recalculated. To calculate the new
probability value of an event (gate), the influence of the safeguards associated with it is
ignored and the probability of occurrence is estimated. Then, all events in the fault tree
are assumed to be a single node and the frequency of occurrence is recalculated with the
safeguard in place. Logical inference rules are developed to incorporate the level of
protection rendered by the safeguard into the fault tree analysis.
1. A safeguard providing "High" level of protection will reduce the frequency of
occurrence by three levels. Example: If the event frequency is "High" and
safeguard provides a high level of protection then the effective frequency of
occurrence would be "occasional".
2. A safeguard providing "Medium" level of protection will reduce the frequency of
occurrence by two levels.
3. A safeguard providing "Low " level of protection will reduce the frequency of
occurrence by one level.
4. A safeguard providing "Very Low" level of protection will affect the frequency of
occurrence.
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Safeguards can also reduce the severity of consequences of a threat on an
asset/activity. Logical inference rules are developed to incorporate the level of protection
rendered by the safeguard into the consequence analysis.
1. A safeguard providing "High" level of protection will reduce the severity of
consequence of a "Catastrophic" event by one level. Example: If the consequence
level is "Catastrophic" and safeguard provides a high level of protection then the
effective consequence would be "Critical".
2. A safeguard providing "High" level of protection will reduce the severity of
consequence of "Critical" and "Marginal" events to "Negligible".
3. A safeguard providing "Medium" level of protection will reduce the severity of
consequence by one level.
4. A safeguard providing "Low " level of protection will not reduce the severity of
consequence
5. A safeguard providing "Very Low" level of protection will not affect the
consequences of a threat.
After the implementation of safeguards, the risk values are reassessed, safeguards
identified and analyzed again to determine the most effective safeguard. This process is
repeated till the risk levels of all the threat/asset pairs are below the acceptable risk level.

CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY

This chapter aims at illustrating the risk mitigation methodology described in the
previous chapter in the form of a case study. The pertinent supply chain information,
necessary for simulating the case study has been provided by Picatinny Arsenal. The
case study focuses on a section of the supply chain to make the depiction of the
methodology easy to comprehend. The supply chain product is a dual-purpose improved
conventional munitions (DPICM) cartridge. The case study simulation is done in
Microsoft Excel using Macros in Visual Basic. The case study serves to better enumerate
the risk mitigation methodology through the analysis and implementation of effective
safeguards to mitigate the risk. The case study is divided into three stages.
•

Stage 1 illustrates the risk mitigation methodology through the identification,
assessment and evaluation of safeguards.

•

Stage 2 simulates the implementation of the most effective safeguard

•

Stage 3 illustrates the response of the methodology to change in degree of
consequence for a threat/asset pair.

5.1 Background
The DPICM cartridge was developed for use in the howitzer gun to leverage light
infantry divisions capabilities and to make them more lethal. When fired with a
supercharge, the extended range DPICM cartridge permits mass fires across the division
front and improves survivability of the troops. This cartridge also allows engagement of
deep targets that was not possible with the previous cartridge.
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The DPICM uses a supercharge to improve the projectile range. The cartridge
contains a sub munitions payload of 42 Dual Purpose grenades. The projectile uses a one
piece all steel carrier which is internally scalloped to contain the cargo without additional
hardware. The grenades use a new Electronic Self Destruct Fuse. This fuse will reduce
the number of DPICM duds on the battlefield and be reasonably safe for friendly
maneuvering or advancing troops.

5.2 Supply Chain Description
The entire supply chain of the DPICM cartridge consists of nine facilities and twenty
three logistics links. Though the methodology is applicable to the entire length of the
supply chain, the case study has been limited to three facilities and three logistics links.
The simple supply chain segment is as shown in Figure 4.1. The logistics links are
represented by dotted lines and the activities within the facility are shown by solid lines.

Figure 5.1 DPICM Cartridge Supply Chain Simulated in Case Study.
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The supply chain structure shown in the Figure 5.1 has two distinct physical flows
(chains) — one, from Factory to Factory Storage and other from Factory to CONUS
Storage. The DPICM cartridge is manufactured at the Factory and is transferred to
Factory Storage and CONUS Storage for further deployment when necessary. Facility
nodes and logistics links associated with the Factory to Factory Storage chain is
represented by asset/activities Al to A4. Trucks are used to transport the manufactured
product from the Factory to Factory Storage. At the Factory, the product is loaded in
containers and loaded onto trucks using forklifts. The trucks then transport the product
from the Factory to Factory Storage, where it is unloaded from the trucks using forklifts
again and putaway into the storage facility until further deployment.
The other sub-chain of the model, Factory to CONUS Storage, is modeled by
assets/activities B1 to B6. Rail transport is used to transport the DPICM cartridges loaded
in containers. The manufactured product is first loaded onto the train using forklift and
then transported to the transfer point where the product is loaded from the rail to truck
using forklift. The truck then transfers it to the CONUS storage site, where the product is
unloaded using forklifts and putaway for storage. The supply chain structure is modeled
by the set of operations listed in Table 5.1.
5.2.1 Operational Parameters

The Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 list the various activities that are carried out, the duration of
activities, the threats associated with each activity and the frequency of occurrence of the
threat for each of the facilities — Factory, Factory Storage and CONUS Storage. Tables
5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 list the threat/activity pairs for the logistics links connection the factory
to the storage facilities.
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Table 5.1 Supply Chain Operation Description
Activity /
Asset
Al
A2
A3
A4
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6

Type of Network
Element
Facility
Logistics
Facility
Facility
Facility
Logistics
Facility
Facility
Logistics
Facility

Description

Factory to Truck using forklift
Factory to Factory Storage
Truck to Factory Storage using forklift
Factory Storage
Factory to Train using forklift
Factory to Storage Site
Storage Site
Storage Site to Truck using forklift
Storage Site to CONUS Storage
Truck to CONUS Storage using forklift

Table 5.2 Threat/Asset Listing for Factory
Activity

Forklift
to Truck
Forklift
to Rail

Duration
(Hrs)

1. 5
0.9

Threats

Frequency

Activity Type

Forklift Tines Puncture Container
Pallets Falls
Forklift Tines Puncture Container
Pallets Falls

Probable
Occasional
Probable
Occasional

Material
Handling
Material
Handling

Table 5.3 Threat/Asset Listing for Factory Storage
Activity

Forklift
to
Bunker
Bunker
Storage

Duration
(Hrs)

Threats

Frequency

Activity
Type

0.3

Forklift Tines Puncture Container
Pallets Falls

Probable
Occasional

Material
Handling

720

Storage
Auto ignition
Battery Initiates
Fire

Remote
Event
Remote
Improbable

Storage

68
Table 5.4 Threat/Asset Listing for CONUS Storage
Activity

Duration
(Hrs)

Threats

Frequency Activity Type

Bunker
Storage

61320

Auto ignition
Battery Initiates
Fire
Storage
Reaction with items

Forklift
to Rail

0. 3

Forklift Tines Puncture Container
Pallet Falls

Probable
Occasional

Material
handling

Forklift
to Truck

1. 5

Probable
Occasional
Remote
Remote

Material
Handling

Forklift
to
Bunker

Forklift Tines Puncture Container
Pallet Falls
Detonation
Pierside Fire

1.9

Forklift Tines Puncture Container
Pallet Falls

Probable
Occasional

Material
Handling

0. 3

Truck Fire
Detonation
Bullet Puncture
Truck Accident

Remote
Remote
Remote
Remote

Material
Handling

Truck to
Bunker

Remote
Remote
Remote
Remote
Remote

Storage

Table 5.5 Threat/Asset Listing for Logistics Link from Factory to Factory Storage
Activity

Duration

Truck to 0.3
Bunker

Threats

Frequency

Activity Type

Truck Fire
Detonation
Bullet Puncture

Remote
Remote
Remote

Land
Transportation

Table 5.6 Threat/Asset Listing for Logistics Link from Factory to CONUS Storage by
Rail
Activity

Duration

Threats

Frequency

Activity Type

Rail to
Conus

336

Rail Fire
Detonation
Bullet Puncture
Rail Accident

Remote
Remote
Remote
Remote

Land
Transportation

69
Table 5.7 Threat/Asset Listing for Logistics Link from Factory to CONUS Storage by
Truck

Activity

Duration Threats

Truck to
Conus

168

Truck Fire
Detonation
Bullet Puncture

Frequency

Activity Type

Remote
Remote
Remote

Land
Transportation

5.2.2 Risk Matrices
The risk matrices pertaining to the threat/activity pairs were obtained from the risk
assessment module of the SCRAMS system and the risk matrices for the case study are
listed in Tables 5.8 through 5.13. This assessment was done using a risk assessment tool
currently being developed as a part of the ongoing research investigating the risk analysis
approach in supply chains. An acceptable risk level of 1.13 E-07 is assumed for all the
assets/activities. Each asset can be assigned a unique acceptable risk level, however, for
simplicity of understanding, a common acceptable risk level has been assumed.

Table 5.8 Risk Matrix for Factory

Table 5.10 Risk Matrix for CONUS Storage
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Table 5.11 Risk Matrix for Logistics link from Factory to Factory Storage by Truck

5.3 Case Study - Stage 1
The first stage of the case study illustrates the safeguard pre-assessment and analysis
methodology. The risk matrices corresponding to the supply chain model is obtained
from the risk assessment process. The list of threat/activity pairs are listed in Figure 4.2.
As can be seen from the figure, the high risk threat/activity pairs are highlighted in
orange. The principle of the methodology is to bring the risk levels associated with the
threat/activity pairs to or below the acceptable risk level.

5.3.1 Safeguard Identification
To identify safeguards to be implemented for mitigating the risk, the causal influences of
the high risk threats need to be identified. This is accomplished through fault tree
analysis. Once the causes are identified, safeguard identification becomes quite
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straightforward. Table 4.14 lists the causes that have been identified which escalate risk
for the activities under consideration.
Depending on the causes, safeguards are identified based on knowledge from
prior assessments or based on expertise of the risk manager. Multiple safeguards are
possible for the same threat asset pair. For example, for the threat/asset pair 'truck fire'
for `A2', three safeguards have been proposed — regular truck maintenance, driver
training and providing cushions for pallets. The safeguards proposed to secure the
assets/activities are listed in Table 5.15

Table 5.14 Listing of Causal Elements that Lead to Elevated Risk in System
Threat

Asset/Activity

Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates

A2
A2
A2
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
B2
B2
B2
B4
B4
B4
B6
B6
B6
B6

Risk
Value
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-05
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06

Cause
Mechanical Fault
Abrupt Braking
Impact
High Temp/Humidity
Proximity to other chemicals
High Temp/Humidity
Impact
Proximity to other chemicals
Fuse Trips
Impact
High Temp/Humidity
Electrical Faults
Mechanical Fault
Abrupt Braking
Impact
High Temp/Humidity
Electrical Faults
Impact
Fuse Trips
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Figure 5.2 Threat asset/activity listing for all activities in the case study.
Table 5.17 Asset Value Listing

High Risk
Assets

Value of
the Asset

Factored
Value of Asset

A2
A4
B2
B4
B6

Medium
Low
High
Medium
Medium

0.5
0.25
0.75
0.5
0.5
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5.3.2 Safeguard Analysis
Once the safeguards are identified, the next step would be to evaluate and analyze the
safeguards. The safeguards are evaluated based on the level of protection that a safeguard
provides to the asset against a threat, the value of the asset being secured, the cost of
implementation of the safeguard, reliability of the safeguard and the probability of intent
against the safeguard by threat activities. These evaluations are based on the judgment of
the risk manager or from prior assessment knowledge. Tables 4.16 to 4.20 provide a
listing of the five safeguard evaluation factors and their numerical values that have been
used in the case study to evaluate the utility and the payoffs of the safeguards.
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Table 5.15 Listing of Safeguards Identified for Mitigating Risk
Threat

Asset/Activity

Risk
Value

Cause

Truck Fire

A2

1.00E-06

Mechanical Fault

Truck Fire
Truck Fire

A2
A2

1.00E-06
1.00E-06

Storage

A4

1.00E-06

Storage

A4

1.00E-06

Autoignition

A4

1.00E-06

Autoignition

A4

1.00E-06

Autoignition

A4

1.00E-06

Autoignition

A4

1.00E-06

Abrupt Braking
Impact
High
Temp/Humidity
Proximity to other
chemicals
High
Temp/Humidity
Impact
Proximity to other
chemicals
Proximity to other
chemicals

A4

1.00E-06

Fuse Trips

Safety Clips

B2

1.00E-05

Rail Fire

B2

1.00E-05

Rail Fire

B2

1.00E-05

Impact
High
Temp/Humidity
Electrical Faults

Truck Fire

B4

1.00E-06

Mechanical Fault

Truck Fire
Truck Fire

B4
B4

1.00E-06
1.00E-06

Storage

B6

1.00E-06

Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery
Initiates

B6
B6
B6

1.00E-06
1.00E-06
1.00E-06

Abrupt Braking
Impact
High
Temp/Humidity
Electrical Faults
Impact
Impact

Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity
Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Regular Truck
Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity
Maintenance
Electrical Inspection
Proper Packaging
Cushions for Pallets

B6

1.00E-06

Fuse Trips

Safety Clips

Battery
Initiates
Rail Fire

Safeguard
Regular Truck
Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity
Maintenance
PeriodicInspection
Temp & Humidity
Maintenance
Cushions for Pallets
Proper Packaging
PeriodicInspection
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Table 5.16 Level of Protection of Safeguards Proposed to Secure the Assets
High
High Risk Threats

Risk
Assets/
Activity

Safeguard

Level of
Protection

Factored
Level of
Protection

Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates

A2
A2
A2
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
B2
B2
B2
B4
B4
B4
B6
B6
B6
B6
B6

Regular Truck Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Cushions for Pallets
Proper Packaging
Periodic Inspection
Safety Clips
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Regular Truck Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Electrical Inspection
Proper Packaging
Cushions for Pallets
Safety Clips

Medium
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Medium
High
Medium
Low
Medium
High
High
Medium
Low
High
Low
Medium
High

0.5
0.75
0.75
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.25
0.5
0.75
0.5
0.25
0.5
0.75
0.75
0.5
0.25
0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75

Once the safeguards are assessed based on the five evaluation factors, the utility
can be computed using the Equation 3.1 as the product of value of the asset and level of
protection the safeguard provides. Figure 5.3 shows the utility values computed for the
safeguards. The net utility is now computed using Equation 3.3.
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Table 5.18 Listing of Implementation Costs of Safeguard
(the cost is factored based on the average cost of implementation of a safeguard)

High Risk
Threats
Truck Fire
1
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates

High
Risk
Assets

Safeguard

A2
A2
A2
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
B2
B2
B2
B4
B4
B4
B6
B6
B6
B6
B6

Regular Truck Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Cushions for Pallets
Proper Packaging
Periodic Inspection
Safety Clips
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Regular Truck Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Electrical Inspection
Proper Packaging
Cushions for Pallets
Safety Clips

Cost
1 $10,000
$6,000
$5,000
$3,000
$8,000
$3,000
$4,000
$1,500
$7,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$6,000
$10,000
$9,000
$6,000
$4,000
$7,000
$1,500
$1,000
$8,000

Factored
Cost
1.78
0.60
0.50
0.30
0.80
0.30
0.40
0.15
0.70
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.60
1.00
0.90
0.60
0.40
0.70
0.15
0.10
0.80
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Table 5.19 Listing of the Reliability of Safeguards (a)
High Risk
Threats
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates

High
Risk
Assets
A2
A2
A2
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
B2
B2
B2
B4
B4
B4
B6
B6
B6
B6
B6

Safeguard
Regular Truck Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Cushions for Pallets
Proper Packaging
Periodic Inspection
Safety Clips
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Regular Truck Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Electrical Inspection
Proper Packaging
Cushions for Pallets
Safety Clips

Reliability
of
Safeguard
High
Very High
Medium
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
Very Low
High
Very High
Very Low
Low
High
Very High
Very High
Very Low
Medium
High
Very Low
Very High
Very High

Factored
Reliability
0.75
0.90
0.50
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.10
0.75
0.90
0.10
0.25
0.75
0.90
0.90
0.10
0.50
0.75
0.10
0.90
0.90
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Table 5.20 Listing of Probability of Intent ((3) Against the Safeguards
High Risk
Threats
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Rail Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Truck Fire
Storage
Autoignition
Autoignition
Autoignition
Battery Initiates

High
Risk
Assets
A2
A2
A2
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
A4
B2
B2
B2
B4
B4
B4
B6
B6
B6
B6
B6

Safeguard
Regular Truck Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Cushions for Pallets
Proper Packaging
Periodic Inspection
Safety Clips
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Periodic Inspection
Regular Truck Maintenance
Train Drivers
Cushions for Pallets
Temp & Humidity Maintenance
Electrical Inspection
Proper Packaging
Cushions for Pallets
Safety Clips

Factored
Probability
Probability
of Intent
of Intent
0.10
Moderate
Marginal
0.05
Low
0.01
0.01
Low
0.01
Low
No
0.00
No
0.00
0.00
No
Low
0.01
m
0.10
0.01
Low
0.00
No
Low
0.01
0.00
No
Marginal
0.05
Low
0.01
Low
0.01
Low
0.01
Low
0.01
Low
0.01
0.01
Low

The stage is now set to generate payoffs and form the game to evaluate the
safeguards against each other. Player 1 in the game would be the safeguards, whose
objective is to secure the assets and player 2 is the threats with an objective to disrupt the
assets. The payoffs

Sj,k and Aj,k

are computed using equation 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.

Figure 4.4 shows the payoffs to the two players. The payoff matrix is now generated with
the safeguards as the row field and assets as the column field. The Payoff Matrix for
stage 1 is shown in Figure 5.5.
The payoff matrix in Figure 4.5 highlights two factors, the most vulnerable asset
(shown in red) and the most effective safeguard (shown in green). In stage 1 of the case
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study, the payoff matrix suggests that the most vulnerable asset/activity is A2 and the
safeguards which can secure A2 are "train drivers", "regular truck maintenance" and
"cushions for pallets". Hence, it is imperative that A2 needs to be secured, but the choice
of safeguards to secure A2 must be made based on highest payoff function. Among these
safeguards, the safeguard with the highest total payoff is "train drivers".

Figure 5.3 Screenshot of the Utility Calculation Table.

Figure 5.4 Screenshot of the table listing the payoffs

Si,k and Aj,k.

Figure 5.5 Payoff matrix for stage 1.
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5.4 Case Study - Stage 2
This stage simulates the implementation of the most effective safeguard and displays
reevaluated risk levels. The previous stage identified the most effective safeguard to
secure asset A2 from the threat of "truck fire" as "train drivers". This demonstrates that
training the truck drivers to handle trucks in a more controlled manner reduces the
frequency of abrupt braking, thereby reducing the probability of truck fire. The
implementation of the safeguard is now simulated and the risk values reassessed. The
safeguard "train drivers" provides a "high" level of protection and hence reduces the
frequency of occurrence of truck fires from "High" to "Occasional". The updated risk
values are displayed with the threat/activity listing in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6 Screen shot of the threat/activity table with updated threat levels.
The new risk status for the threat asset pairs from stage 1 is shown above. The
updated utility formulation table is shown in Figure 5.7 and the updated payoff matrix is
displayed in Figure 5.8. Note that, as the threats become acceptable, the utility and
payoffs of the safeguards are reset to zero.

Figure 5.7 Screenshot of the updated utility formulation table.

Figure 5.8 Updated pay off matrix after implementation of safeguard.
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The updated payoff matrix reveals that the most vulnerable asset has now shifted
from A2 to A4 and the most effective safeguard is now 'Periodic Inspection'. Hence, the
frequency of occurrence for threat associated with asset A4 and B2 will be updated next.
In this manner, the safeguards can be implemented one after the other till all the risk
levels are below acceptable limits.

5.5 Case Study - Stage 3
This stage aims at determining the response of the methodology to change in degree of
consequence of a threat on an asset. To achieve this, it is assumed that the severity of
consequence of fork tines puncturing the container housing the explosive material has
increased by one level, thereby increasing the risk to unacceptable levels.
Notice that the treat level for asset Al has become unacceptable due to the
increase in consequences of the threat "fork tines puncture container". The safeguard
proposed for securing the containers against fork tines is by providing "proper
packaging" for explosives inside the container. This would reduce the frequency of
occurrence and thereby the risk associated with it. The utility table is displayed in Figure
4.10 and the payoff formulation for stage 3 is as shown in Figure 4.11.
The payoff matrix displayed in figure 4.11 indicates that the most attractive asset
is now A4 and the most effective safeguard is 'proper packaging'. The safeguard
implemented thus reduces the frequency of occurrence thereby reducing the risk
associated with each threat/asset pairs.

89

Figure 4.9 Screenshot of table listing risk status of the threat/activity pairs with new
threat activity.

Figure 4.10 Utility Table for stage 3.

Figure 4.11 Payoff Matrix for Stage 3.

CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND SCOPE OF FUTURE RESEARCH

Clearly, the risks that exist in today's complex supply chain networks are significant and
on the rise. To mitigate these risks, it is important to understand system vulnerabilities
and what the potential consequences are. The challenges are not only in assessing risk for
an individual asset or activity, but also relate those up to causal events at all levels from
the supplier to customer. Companies who opt to brush aside supply chain risk open
themselves to significant vulnerabilities that can dramatically impact business continuity.
The future of supply management is reliant on the abilities of the risk manager to
balance return and risk to achieve a desired outcome in the financial and sustainability
perspectives. The timely identification and mitigation of supply chain risk on a global
basis will enable a strong and reliable business model with capabilities to lower the long
term costs and drive supply chain management results that secure businesses. But
creating and implementing a supply risk mitigation and management strategy is not
simple. Successful enterprises must understand both the internal and external factors that
drive supply risks, as well as develop scenario and risk mitigation strategies that take into
account the market condition extremes and reduce business risk through proactively
managing the global supply network.
To create supply chain strategies that weigh supply chain risk against the cost of
mitigating the risk, firms should employ a systematic, but comprehensive analytical risk
mitigation framework. The methodology should have the ability to identify centralized
risk elements, filter out high-contingency risks by analyzing risk influences and estimate
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the impact associated with each risk. Safeguards must then be identified to mitigate the
effects of the threats that pose risk. Threats can be prevented, reduced or averted based on
the extent or frequency of consequences of threat elements on the business assets and
their related vulnerabilities. To ensure stability, these vulnerabilities and weaknesses
should be resolved before the threats exploit them.
Risk mitigation has a wider ambit than just identifying the cause of risk and
implementing any protective measure that can mitigate the risks. The causes of risks have
to be effectively measured, appropriate safeguard alternatives identified and the best
safeguard implemented. Safeguards should be assessed based on the utility they provide
toward securing the assets against the threats, their reliability, cost of implementation and
the overall effectiveness of the safeguard. A good safeguard should provide a good utility
for its cost, secure assets effectively and should not be vulnerable to disruptive factors.
The Supply Chain Risk Assessment and Management methodology discussed in
this thesis provides the risk manager with a highly elaborate and robust tool to analyze
and manage supply chain risks more effectively with ease. The risk mitigation
methodology proposed imparts a certain degree of intelligence making strategic risk
mitigation decisions undemanding. The use of game theoretic model provides a two-sided
perspective to the risk environment — the attractiveness of the assets (for threat elements)
and the vulnerabilities of the asset (for risk manager). This clearly identifies the assets,
which are most vulnerable, and enables prioritizing the assets to be secured.
The mathematical approach proposed for the generation of payoffs is
comprehensive taking into consideration the factors which would contribute to rational
decision making — the reliability of the safeguard, the number of assets the safeguard
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secures, its utility, cost of implementation and any disruptive threat influences on the
safeguard. This detailed safeguard evaluation enables the risk manager to evaluate the
safeguards from various points of view and choose the safeguard that not only provides
good utility but also is reliable and justifies its cost.
Risk assessment for any risk environment is futile unless backed up by a good risk
mitigation approach and vice versa. Hence an integrated approach toward risk
management is entailed with reliable risk identification and mitigation resources to confer
organizations the competitive edge during uncertain times.

Scope of Future Work
The Supply Chain Risk Assessment and Management System (SCRAMS), being
developed as a web based application at Multi-Lifecycle Engineering Research Center
(MERC), envisions being the next generation risk management tool that can enable better
visibility of the risk elements and their degrees of impact within the supply chain and
thereby enabling more sophisticated approach to risk management. The risk assessment
module capable of identifying and analyzing risk influences has been developed by
Venkata Kallepalli and has been seamlessly integrated into the web based architecture.
However, data extraction has not been embedded into the SCRAM system. Data
pertaining to the supply chain assets and activities could be extracted from legacy
databases or from the ERP systems like SAP.
The supply chain risk mitigation methodology proposed in this thesis needs to be
embedded into the web-based architecture of the SCRAMS. The integration of Bayesian
networks or fuzzy logic with game theoretic decision making, needs to be explored
further.

APPENDIX A
RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION METHODOLOGY

Figure 7.1 illustrated the systematic approach that has been designed to generate the
Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Management (SCRAM) tool. The first section of the
diagram demonstrates the risk assessment approach and the latter section of the flow
diagram illustrates the risk mitigation approach.
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Figure 7.1 Illustrates the risk management approach adopted in the SCRAM System.

APPENDIX B
SCRAM SYSTEM APPROACH

The SCRAM system is a web-enabled risk assessment and management system
developed to address the issue of securing the business supply chains against
vulnerabilities. Figure 7.2 illustrates the sequential approach of the decision tool.
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Figure 7.2 Sequential approach adopted by SCRAM system.
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